The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 by Brin, Igor M.
The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration law may never be the same again. The Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2009 (AFA)I amends the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 2 Responding
to volumes of judicial precedent enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements
(PDAA), 3 AFA voids all PDAAs in consumer agreements, franchise
agreements, employment contracts, and PDAAs which require arbitration of
statutory claims. 4 AFA comes in the wake of decades of judicial precedent
that expanded the reach of the FAA,5 including a recent Supreme Court
decision, that resolved an eighteen year controversy in arbitration law and
held that PDAAs requiring arbitration of statutory claims are valid, even if
entered into collectively through a collective bargaining agreement (CBA),
rather than individually.6
Part II covers the factual background leading up to AFA, including an
overview of arbitration and PDAAs, the FAA and its judicial progeny, the
ensuing normative debate, and empirical research on both sides of the
controversy. 7 Part III explains the AFA, including an overview, findings
cited by the bills' sponsors, and the amendments the AFA makes to the
FAA. 8 Part IV analyzes the AFA, including arguments in favor and against,
and other proposals for reform.9 Part V concludes that the AFA is the largest
legislative decision on arbitration since the FAA and stands to bring
Congress into direct confrontation with the Supreme Court, with policy
arguments on both sides of the controversy, and ambiguous empirical
evidence.' 0
I Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. Res. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2009, S. Res. 931, 111th Cong. (2009). This note does not cover
companion bills related to nursing homes: the Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act
of 2009, H.R. Res. 1237, 111th Cong. (2009); and the Fairness in Nursing Home
Arbitration Act, S. Res. 512, 111th Cong. (2009).
2 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1947).
3 See infra Part II.B.2-3.
4 See infra Part III.
5 See infra Part II.B.
6 14 Penn Plaza L.L.C. v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009) (enforcing PDAA
within CBA requiring arbitration of ADEA claims).
7 See infra Part II.
8 See infra Part III.
9 See infra Part V.
10 See infra Part VI.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview ofArbitration and Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements
Arbitration is a private forum for dispute resolution where parties submit
their dispute to a third party (or panel of third parties) who will review the
facts and the law, and issue a binding "award."" The key difference between
litigation and arbitration is that, generally, the arbitrator's decision is un-
appealable.12 A trial court decision may be appealed to review conclusions of
law "de novo,"13 and findings of fact if they are "clearly erroneous."14 On the
other hand, absent fraud or dishonesty by the arbitrator, an appellate court
may not overturn or modify an arbitrator's award, even if it disagrees with
the factual findings and the arbitrator's choice of law.15
11 See, e.g., Arbitration, Amer. Arb. Ass'n, 2007, http://www.adr.org/arb med (last
visited Apr. 8, 2010) (American Arbitration Association's definition of arbitration);
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 112 (8th ed. 2008) ("A method of dispute resolution
involving one or more neutral third parties ... whose decision is binding.").
12 FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (2006) (FAA grounds for vacating and modifying an
arbitration award); see also Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 587-90
(2008) (holding that the FAA sections 10-11 provide the exclusive grounds for
overturning an arbitrator's award).
13 Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232 (1994) (holding that the preclusive effect of a
jury verdict is a question of law which is reviewed de novo). When applying de novo
review, the appellate court independently reviews the conclusions of law and does not
give deference to lower court interpretations. Exner v. F.B.I., 612 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th
Cir. 1980) (Pregerson, J., concurring) ('de novo' means trying the matter anew, the same
as if it had not been heard before and as if no decision had been previously rendered.")
(quoting Farmingdale Supermarket, Inc. v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 534, 536 (D.C.
N.J. 1971)).
14 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947-48 (1995) (applying
de novo review to conclusions of law, but accepting findings of fact as valid unless
"clearly erroneous"); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) ("Findings of fact. . .must not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous."). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when a
reviewing court is left with the firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, even
if there is evidence to the support the finding. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
15 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-1; see also First Options of Chicago, Inc., 514 U.S. at 942;
United Paperworkers Int'I Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-39 (1987)
(describing limited grounds for overturning arbitration award); Lorraine M. Brennan et
al., Recent Developments in International Commercial Arbitration, 16 DISP. RESOL.
MAG. 14, 15-16 (2009) (providing an overview of "evident partiality" and "manifest
disregard" standards, and the current uncertainty in arbitration appeals).
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PDAAs are forum selection clauses which require arbitration of future
disputes.16 PDAAs are controversial because the decision to arbitrate is a
decision to opt-out of a judicial forum.' 7 However, PDAAs are popular
because they allow parties complete discretion in choosing the applicable
procedure, the applicable law, and the decisionmaker before the dispute has
arisen-a time when they are most likely to mutually assent.18 If a PDAA
meets the elements of a traditional contract, courts will hold parties to their
bargain regardless of when the agreement was signed, even if the court
would reach a different decision than the arbitrator, on the law or on the
merits.19 The judiciary's role is limited to determining issues of
"arbitrability": whether the claim at issue is governed by the PDAA; if it is,
all the court can do is enforce the agreement. 20 However, courts may rely on
contract defenses to invalidate some PDAAs.21
B. The FAA and Its Judicial Progeny
1. The Federal Arbitration Act Reverses Judicial Hostility Towards
Arbitration
Before the FAA, most courts viewed all arbitration agreements, not just
PDAAs, with hostility; arbitration agreements were voidable, and void if one
party objected.22 The FAA, passed in 1925, was designed to eliminate these
16 E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295 (2002) (referring to an
arbitration agreement as a forum selection clause).
17 AssOCIATION FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARBITRATION
FAIRNEss ACT OF 2009, at 24 (2009) [hereinafter ACR REPORT].
18 Id. at 34. Mutual assent is a key element to any contract. Utley v. Donaldson, 94
U.S. 29, 47 (1876) ("There can be no contract without the mutual assent of the parties.
This is vital to its existence.").
19 United Paperworkers, 484 U.S. at 36-38; ACR REPORT, supra note 17, at 31.
20 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (holding that
arbitrability is an issue to be decided by the courts unless the PDAA expressly reserves
the issue for the arbitrator); see also United Paperworkers, 484 U.S. at 36-38.
21 Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683, 687 (1996) (holding that
contract defenses may be used to void arbitration agreements, but state law grounds for
annulment cannot conflict with the FAA).
22 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-71 (1995); ACR
REPORT, supra note 17, at 54.
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impediments to arbitration agreements. 23 The FAA affirmed that written
agreements to arbitrate current or future disputes involving maritime and
commercial transactions were valid, irrevocable, and enforceable when
entered into voluntarily by parties of comparable power and sophistication.24
The FAA was followed by similar state statutes,25 including the Uniform
Arbitration Act of 1955.26
2. Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements Spread Eroding the
Perception of Voluntariness
In response to congressional encouragement via the FAA and Supreme
Court support through a series of decisions known as the "Steelworkers
Trilogy," 27 contractual choice of venue provisions providing for arbitration
(a.k.a. PDAAs) were no longer voidable at will. PDAAs became standard in
CBAs and began appearing in consumer contracts (traditionally governed by
state law), franchise agreements, and non-union employment contracts.28
23 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); ACR REPORT,
supra note 17, at 18-19.
24 FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (discussing "[v]alidity, irrevocability, and enforcement
of agreements to arbitrate."); see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489-91 (1987)
(holding that pursuant to section 2 of the FAA, PDAAs are enforceable in state and
federal courts).
25 ACR REPORT, supra note 17, at 55.
26 UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-33 (amended 2000), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uarba/arbitratl213.pdf. Thirteen states have
substantially adopted the 2000 revision. Harry N. Mazadoorian, Whatever Happened to
the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act?: A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the
Legislature, 16 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 21 (2009).
27 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960)
(holding that when interpreting PDAAs in CBAs, the courts' function is limited to
determining whether a particular claim is governed by the PDAA, and if it is, no judicial
inquiry should be made regarding the merits of the claim); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-99 (1960) (holding that while an
arbitrator's award must be based on the PDAA within a CBA, courts may not inquire into
the merits of the arbitrator's award, even if the court disagrees with the arbitrator's
interpretation of the PDAA or the reasons for the award are ambiguous); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-83 (1960)
(holding that all claims arising under a CBA are presumed to be within the scope of
PDAA unless expressly provided otherwise and that doubts should be resolved in favor
of arbitrability).
28 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-75, 281
(1995) (enforcing PDAA in consumer pest-control contract); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35
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However, even with the passage of the FAA, courts refused to extend
arbitration agreements into unfamiliar territory such as statutory claims29 and
class actions.30 Employees could pursue statutory discrimination claims de
novo in Court, even if required to use arbitration for contract claims.31
Consumers and franchisees could pursue their low-stakes claims collectively
through class action, unless an agreement expressly provided otherwise. 32
However, the Steelworkers Trilogy 33 was a precursor to further Supreme
Court expansion of arbitration and the impact of PDAAs on employees,
consumers, and franchisees. 34
3. Scope ofArbitrability Increases Raising Questions ofFairness
A traditionally debated area of FAA expansion concerns statutory claims.
If an individual employee consents to arbitration of a statutory claim,
arbitrators have authority to interpret, apply, and decide questions relating to
most federal statutes (thereby displacing public courts). 35 In addition,
through a CBA unions may collectively consent to waive the individual
employee's right to pursue statutory claims in court.36 If the waiver is "clear
and unmistakable," 37 the party objecting to arbitration possesses the burden
(enforcing PDAA in employment agreement); Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17
(1984) (enforcing PDAA in 7-Eleven franchise agreement).
29 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (prohibiting arbitrators from arbitrating
conflicts based on interpreting and applying the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a
(1933)), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
484 (1989).
30 Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1995) (refusing to
compel class arbitration where PDAA was silent), abrogated by Stolt-Nielsen SA v.
AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2793
(2009); see also Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Franchising,
Arbitration, and the Future of the Class Action, 3:2 ENTREPRENEuRIAL Bus. L.J. 275, 284
(2009) (quoting Champ v. Siegel, 55 F.3d at 275).
31 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1974).
32 Champ v. Siegel, 55 F.3d at 275.
33 See supra text accompanying note 27 (explaining three cases comprising
Steelworkers Trilogy).
34 See ACR REPORT, supra note 17, at 46 (suggesting that the judicial expansion of
arbitration may have been aligned with the "privatization" movement of the 1980s).
35 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 28 (1991).
36 14 Penn Plaza L.L.C. v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009) (enforcing PDAA
within CBA requiring arbitration of ADEA claims).
37 Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998).
825
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
of proof to demonstrate that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of the
claim at issue.38
An emerging concern is the expansion of the FAA to include class
actions. Where a PDAA is silent, arbitrators have sole authority to determine
if claimants may bypass the PDAA and pursue their claim through class
action in litigation. 39 Where a "class action waiver,"40 "class arbitration
waiver,"41 or "collective action waiver"42 is express, federal courts are split
as to whether the waiver is enforceable. 43 In addition, a pro-PDAA Supreme
Court recently granted certiorari to determine whether class arbitration can
be compelled when the PDAA is silent on the issue.44
These and other decisions by the Court have resulted in a pro-arbitration
judicial policy much at odds with the pre-FAA judiciary.45 Not only are
employees (both union and non-union) required to arbitrate statutory claims,
but consumers and franchisees are required to pursue low-stake claims
through arbitration and individually (if class arbitration is waived). In
addition, PDAAs cannot grant courts authority to overturn arbitrators'
decisions on grounds other than provided for in the FAA, 46 parties may
contract for punitive damages (even if prohibited by state law), 47 and a non-
signatory may enforce a PDAA against a signatory if allowed by contract
38 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626, 628
(1985); see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
39 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452-53 (2003).
40 Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 30, at 279 (stating a "class action waiver" is a
provision in a CBA which waives the right to bring a class action in court).
41 Id. at 280 (stating a "class arbitration waiver" is a provision in a CBA which
waives the right to pursue a class action in arbitration).
42 Id. (stating a "collective action waiver" is a waiver of the right to pursue a class
action in court and in arbitration).
43 Id. at 290.
4 Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2793 (2009); see also
David Moora, US. Supreme Court to Review Whether Class Arbitration Can Be
Compelled if Arbitration Clause Is Silent, ADR News and Cases, 16 DISP. RESOL. MAG.
30,30 (2009) (overview of precedent and facts relevant to Stolt-Nielsen).
45 See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1874) (holding that
PDAAs are "illegal and void"), superseded by FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947), as recognized
in Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 1993); U.S.
Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)
(invalidating PDAA), superseded by 9 U.S.C. § 1, as recognized in Sverdrup Corp., 989
F.2d at 153.
46 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 587-90 (2008).
47 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1995).
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beneficiary law.48 Such developments have generated an intense policy
debate about whether courts are steering the FAA in the proper direction.49
C. The Ensuing Normative Debate
The spread of PDAAs and expansion of arbitrability has not gone
unnoticed.50 This development has divided the legal community for three
decades and generated normative arguments on both sides of the
controversy.51 The normative debate splits on three key issues. First, scholars
disagree whether PDAAs are voluntary undertakings to arbitrate.52 Second,
they disagree as to whether arbitration procedures are fair compared to
litigation, which concerns the adequacy of procedural protections available in
arbitration, sufficiency of arbitrator awards, and accessibility to arbitral
forums. 53 Finally, scholars disagree whether arbitration impedes the
development of statutory law. 54
1. Arbitration as a Voluntary Choice?
The issue of whether PDAAs are voluntary agreements to arbitrate is
especially contentious following 14 Penn Plaza.55 Proponents of PDAAs
point out that plenty of employment, franchise, and consumer agreements are
entered into after negotiation, and even if not, individuals may reject
contracts with PDAAs and seek other economic opportunities or purchase
different products. 56 Opponents respond that PDAAs are contained in
boilerplate language within contracts of adhesion, given on a "take-it-or-
leave-it" basis,57 and dismiss proponents' "freedom to reject" claim on the
grounds that certain consumer products are a necessity and alternate
48 Arthur Andersen L.L.P. v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1902 (2009).
49 See infra Part II.C.
50 See infra Part II.C. 1-3 (overview of debate regarding PDAAs).
51 See id.
52 See infra Part II.C.1.
53 David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1247, 1254-57 (2009); see also infra Part H.C.2.
54 See infra Part H.C.3.
55 14 Penn Plaza L.L.C. v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009) (enforcing PDAA
within CBA requiring arbitration of ADEA claims).
56 ACR REPORT, supra note 17, at 23.
57 Id. at 22.
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employment is often difficult to find.58 The consent debate also depends on
whether arbitration is a fair forum for compelled dispute resolution. 59
2. Arbitration and Fairness?
One debate related to fairness is whether arbitration procedures are
adequate. Opponents claim that arbitration agreements waive rights to court-
supervised discovery and jury trials,60 and that private arbitrators are under
financial coercion to create systems that favor corporate repeat players.6'
Opponents also point out that arbitration is not transparent because hearings
are held in private, written decisions are not always published,62 and that
arbitration is unnecessary because it displaces existing forums such as pre-
trial proceedings, small claims courts, courts of limited jurisdiction, and
administrative tribunals. 63 Proponents respond that ADR providers do not
favor repeat players because they need to build their reputation as impartial
and qualified providers of ADR.64 In addition, the fact that there is no public
hearing or written opinion is not an issue; individuals use arbitration because
of privacy,65 arbitrators can be required and trained to write proper
opinions,66 and some providers, such as the American Arbitration
Association, already publish information pertaining to important filings.67
Others question whether arbitration produces fair outcomes. Opponents
argue that many PDAAs contain unfair provisions which prohibit statutory
58 Id. at 26-28.
59 See infra Part II.C.2.
60 Joseph D. Garrison, The Employee's Perspective: Mandatory Binding Arbitration
Constitutes Little More than a Waiver of a Worker's Rights, in HANDBOOK ON
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION & ADR 311, 311-12 (Thomas E. Carbonneau et al. eds.,
2007).
61 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. Res. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2(4) (2009); S.
Res. 931, 111th Cong. § 2(4) (2009); see also Schwartz, supra note 53, at 1309-12
(providing an overview of empirical research on "repeat player" effect).
62 H.R. Res. 1020 § 2(6); S. Res. 931 § 2(6); see also ACR REPORT, supra note 17,
at 33.
63 See Schwartz, supra note 53, at 1258.
6 ACR REPORT, supra note 17, at 82.
6 5 Id. at 33.
66 Id. at 80.
67 Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 30, at 296.
828
[Vol. 25:3 2010]
THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2009
rights and limit award size. 68 Proponents respond that state unconscionability
law provides adequate protection against unfair agreements, 69 arbitrators are
more predictable than juries, 70 and arbitration creates a greater likelihood of
reinstatement than litigation7' because it allows for earlier resolution of
workplace problems. 72
The third aspect of fairness concerns whether arbitration is more or less
accessible than litigation. Proponents of PDAAs point out that arbitration is a
necessary alternative to litigation because there is no reasonable evidence
that courts are accessible to all parties, especially low-income individuals. 73
They also point out that federal agencies that investigate statutory claims are
unable to keep up with their dockets, 74 and claimants in arbitration are not
obligated to miss work to pursue their claims because arbitration does not
require personal appearance. 75 Opponents respond that many PDAAs ban
class actions and require travel to distant forums. 76
3. Arbitration and the Law?
A final issue is whether PDAAs impede the development of the common
law. Opponents argue that PDAAs impede the progress of civil rights and
consumer law, and undermine the judiciary's capacity to ensure consistent
68 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. Res. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2(7) (2009); S.
Res. 931, 111th Cong. § 2(7) (2009).
69 Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer
Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REv. 1051, 1074-78 (2009).
70 Martin J. Oppenheimer & Cameron Johnstone, A Management Perspective:
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Are an Effective Alternative to Employment
Litigation, in HANDBOOK ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION & ADR, supra note 60, at 303,
306.
71 Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y
J. 221,245-55 (1997).
72 Oppenheimer & Johnstone, supra note 70, at 306.
73 ACR REPORT, supra note 17, at 7.
74 FitzGibbon, supra note 71, at 245-47 (providing an overview of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission docket); see also Oppenheimer & Johnstone,
supra note 70, at 308-09.
75 Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Reform: What We Know and What We Need to
Know, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 579, 581 (2009).
76 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. Res. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2(7) (2009); S.
Res. 931, 111th Cong. § 2(7) (2009).
829
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
statutory interpretation for comparable cases.77 Proponents respond that
rather than impeding the development of law, arbitrators decide by applying
civil rights statutes78 and adhere to precedent rather than diverge from it.79 In
addition, they argue that applying judicial standards of review to arbitration
awards would undermine several benefits associated with the process,
including speed, efficiency, decisionmaker expertise, and tailored remedies.80
D. The Empirical Debate
The empirical debate divides along the same lines as the normative
debate, with both sides disagreeing whether PDAAs are voluntary, fair, and
beneficial to the common law. Proponents on both sides of the issue have a
peculiar relationship with existing empirical evidence. First, they cite it in
support.81 Second, they dismiss it as incomplete. 82 Third, given the statistical
uncertainty, they defer the burden to the other side, arguing that their side is a
fairer default position.83 Federal and state courts are similarly split.84
77 H.R. Res. 1020 § 2(5); S. Res. 931 § 2(5).
78 ACR REPORT, supra note 17, at 83.
79 Id
80 Id. at 32,49-50.
81 See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Point: The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness
Act, 16 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 4, 7 (2009) (arguing that empirical data demonstrates that
arbitration produces better outcomes and faster results than litigation). But see Schwartz,
supra note 53, at 1309-15 (arguing that litigation may be cheaper than arbitration and
that empirical evidence demonstrates the existence of the repeat player effect).
82 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 53, at 1284-1309, 1328-29 (highlighting
difficulties associated with data collection and flaws in popular studies, including
baseline values used for comparison, potential that cases submitted to arbitration and
litigation are inherently different, omission of settlements, and improper sampling and
sorting); see also ACR REPORT, supra note 17, at 68 (highlighting challenges encountered
when gathering empirical data for arbitration); Cole & Blankley, supra note 69, at 1079
(finding that empirical record on consumer arbitration is incomplete); Rutledge, supra
note 75, at 584-85 (stressing the need for more research, especially studies focusing on
outcomes, whether post-dispute arbitration agreements are a feasible alternative to
PDAAs, the financial impact of arbitration, and how PDAAs fit into a company's broader
dispute resolution framework).
83 See Rutledge, supra note 75, at 584 (arguing that Congress should be cautious
when attempting arbitration reform given the limited empirical record). But see Schwartz,
supra note 53, at 1259, 1315-20, 1325-27, 1333-38 (arguing that the absence of
evidence demonstrating the benefits of litigation over arbitration is not reason alone to
infer that litigation is not a better alternative than arbitration and impede reform); Jean R.
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1. Arbitration as a Voluntary Choice?
Empirical research does support the position that many adults are bound
by PDAAs.85 Many consumer contracts (ranging from 0%-76.9% by
industry),86 employment contracts (ranging from 10%-92.9% by industry),87
and franchise agreements (43.7%)88 contain PDAAs, and the numbers are
increasing compared to prior studies. 9 On the other hand, PDAAs are not as
widespread as opponents tend to argue; less than a quarter of business
contracts contain PDAAs.90 In addition, although PDAAs are prevalent in
consumer and employment contracts, 91 use varies across industrieS92 and is
most widespread in industries where a high concentration of the market share
is held by a few companies. 93 However, the spread of PDAAs is not
Sternlight, Counterpoint: Fixing the Mandatory Arbitration Problem: We Need the
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, 16 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 5, 5-6 (2009) (arguing that it is
better for reform to be too broad, rather than too narrow).
84 Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and NonConsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
871, 874-75 (2008) (highlighting inconsistency in both federal & state courts when
applying doctrine of unconscionably to PDAAs).
85 ACR REPORT, supra note 17, at 23 (referencing computer equipment purchase
agreements, telecommunications agreements, service agreements, and more than 700
million credit card agreements).
86 Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 30, at 298-99; see also ACR REPORT, supra
note 19, at 25; Eisenberg et al., supra note 84, at 882-83.
87 Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 30, at 299 (estimating between 10% and 41.6%).
But see Eisenberg et al., supra note 84, at 883 (finding that 92.9% of businesses used
PDAAs in their employment contracts).
88 Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 30, at 299.
89 Eisenberg et al., supra note 84, at 877-78 (overview of previous empirical
studies); see also Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration:
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 405, 409 (citing
General Accounting Office study conducted in 1995). However, use of PDAAs in
franchise agreements has remained steady for years. Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 30,
at 278.
90 Eisenberg et al., supra note 84, at 886.
91 Id.
92 Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 30, at 278.
93 Eisenberg et al., supra note 84, at 891-92.
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necessarily a bad development given that judicial and administrative dockets
need assistance. 94
2. Arbitration and Fairness?
Empirical research concerning process fairness is uncertain.
Comparisons of small claims cases to arbitration hearings yield few
differences. 95 Research does not support the claim that repeat players have an
advantage in arbitral forums. 96 However the available data does raise some
concerns about the intentions behind PDAAs, such as the observation that
while most companies use PDAAs in consumer contracts, less than 10% use
them in non-consumer, non-employment business contracts. This data
suggests companies prefer to litigate against peers and arbitrate against less
formidable opponents.97 Similarly, while no employment or consumer
contracts without PDAAs waive jury trials if PDAAs are treated as a jury
trial waiver, then most consumer (76.9%) and employment (92.9%) contracts
contain a jury trial waiver.98
Research is inconclusive regarding whether damage awards are lower in
arbitration than litigation.99 Some studies support the position that consumers
and non-union employees get less favorable results in arbitration than in
court.100 Others studies support the position that arbitration allows for faster
94 For example, employment discrimination alone amounts to 20% of all federal and
state court claims. Oppenheimer & Johnstone, supra note 70, at 305.
95 Rutledge, supra note 75, at 581 (finding no statistically significant difference
between win rates in small claims courts and arbitration).
96 ACR REPORT, supra note 17, at 84; see also Eisenberg et al., supra note 84, at
894.
97 Eisenberg et al., supra note 84, at 876.
98 Id. at 885-86.
99 1d. at 873.
100 See, e.g., Public Citizen, The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies
Ensnare Consumers 2 (2007), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) (finding
that virtually all consumers lose in consumer arbitration).
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resolution of disputes with comparable outcomes.101 However, both sides
dismiss each other's conclusions, citing poor methodology.102
In terms of accessibility, arbitrator fees can range from $3,750 to
$14,000,103 although a recent study demonstrated that most consumers do not
pay fees in collections arbitration.104 However, there are some indications
that PDAAs are displacing class actions. Since Green Tree105 class
arbitration filings have increased,10 6 and use of class action waivers, class
arbitration waivers, and "nonseverability" 0 7 provisions has become more
common in franchise agreements.108 A recent study also concluded that
businesses may be using PDAAs to avoid aggregate dispute resolution.109
Even so, despite an increase in class arbitration filings since Green Tree,110 a
recent study reasoned that class action waivers are not a threat to the future
of class actions because of a split in the judiciary which makes it difficult to
predict whether a court will enforce class action waivers and non-severability
101 Cole & Blankley, supra note 69, at 1064-67, 1072-73 (finding that consumers
tend to pay less in collection arbitration than the amount claimed by creditors and have a
faster rate of dispute resolution through arbitration than litigation).
102 See supra text accompanying note 82 (sample of articles criticizing
methodologies employed by empirical studies evaluating impact of PDAAs); see also
Cole & Blankley, supra note 69, at 1052-64 (criticizing Public Citizen report on grounds
that study was designed to reach adverse conclusion).
103 Ronald Turner, Employment Discrimination, Labor and Employment
Arbitration, and the Case Against Union Waiver of the Individual Worker's Statutory
Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 EMORY L.J. 135, 166 (2000).
104 Cole & Blankley, supra note 69, at 1067-70 (finding that business parties paid
approximately 99% of all arbitration fees).
105 Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452-53 (2003) (holding that
where a PDAA is silent, arbitrators have sole authority to determine whether claimants
may pursue their claims through class action litigation).
106 Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 30, at 285-87 (discussing the impact of Green
Tree, 539 U.S. at 452-53).
107 A "nonseverability" provision prohibits a court from severing an invalid class
arbitration waiver from a PDAA and permitting a class of claimants to enforce the PDAA
(i.e. requiring class arbitration), by specifying that the entire PDAA is unenforceable if a
court holds that the class arbitration waiver is invalid. Id. at 278, 294.
108 Id. at 288-90, 294-95.
109 Eisenberg et al., supra note 84, at 888-90 (finding that research supports the
position that companies are using PDAAs to avoid class actions and class arbitrations).
110 Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 444.
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provisions. As a result, businesses using PDAAs with such provisions do so
at their own risk.'
3. Arbitration and the Law
Finally, no solid research exists in terms of arbitration's compatibility
with the common law. Opponents point out that reporters are full of cases
highlighting how PDAAs have been abused.1 2 Proponents respond that such
cases demonstrate the capacity of courts to deal with improper PDAAs
through the doctrine of unconscionability (although their ability to do so
varies by state).1 3 Additionally, a court's refusal to invalidate agreements on
unconscionability grounds or claims of arbitrator bias is not necessarily a bad
omen, especially because this indicates that courts are putting more faith in
arbitrators to properly resolve disputes.114
1II. THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2009
A. Overview
The AFA is composed of two parallel bicameral democratic efforts:115
House Resolution 1020 introduced by Representative Henry Johnson (D-
Ill Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 30, at 293-98. By using a PDAA waiver a
business may insulate itself from class litigation or arbitration. But if the court finds a
waiver unconscionable, it may sever the waiver from the PDAA and require class
arbitration (a result at odds with the business's interest). Similarly, if the PDAA contains
a nonseverability provision, courts may waive the entire PDAA and permit class action in
court (another result at odds with the business's interest). Id.
112 See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (invaliding a
PDAA because it lacked "bilaterality"); Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-40
(4th Cir. 1999) (finding that the purpose of the PDAA was to undermine, rather than
sustain, neutrality); Brower v. Gateway 2000 Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998)) (invalidating PDAA because cost of pursuing a claim through arbitration
often exceeded the value of claim).
113 ACR REPORT, supra note 17, at 34-35.
114 Cole & Blankley, supra note 69, at 1074-75.
115 The House bill has 109 cosponsors; all are Democrats, with the exception of one
Ohio Republican. GovTrack.us, H.R. 1020: Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl ll-1020 (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
The Senate bill has eleven co-sponsors; all are Democrats. GovTrack.us, S. 931:
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=slll-
931 (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
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GA)"l 6 and Senate Resolution 931 introduced by Senator Russell Feingold
(D-WI).' 17 Both bills are currently in committees.118 The House bill was
referred in March 2009 and the Senate Bill was referred in April 2009.119
The House bill has some public support.120 Both bills are the successors of
similar companion bills introduced in the previous Congress,121 and a Senate
bill introduced in the 107th Congress; 122 all three of these previous efforts
stalled in committee. 123
116 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. Res. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).
117 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. Res. 931, 111th Cong. (2009).
118 GovTrack.us, H.R. 1020: Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, Committee
Assignments, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 11-
1020&tab-committees (last visited Mar. 11, 2010); GovTrack.us, S. 931: Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2009, Committee Assignments,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sl 11-931 &tab=committees (last visited
Mar. 11, 2010).
119 GovTrack.us, H.R. 1020: Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl11-1020 (last visited Mar. 11, 2010);
GovTrack.us, S. 931: Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sl 11-931 (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
120 The House bill has eleven public sponsors: California Labor and Employment
Law, The Consumerist, Home Owners Against Deficient Dwellings, Public Citizen,
National Association of Consumer Advocates, Home Owners for Better Building,
National Employment Lawyers Association, Coalition of Franchisee Associations,
USLaw, ATrialLawyer, and the Drum Major Institute. GovTrack.us, H.R. 1020:
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h lll-
1020 (last visited Mar. 11, 2010). It only has two public opponents: the American Health
Care Association and National Center for Assisted Living. Id.
121 The previous efforts are similar to their current 110th congressional counterparts,
except that the previous Senate bill did not include civil rights disputes. Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=hl 10-3010; Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2007, S. Res. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=sl 10-1782.
122 The 107th Senate bill was an attempt to impose model arbitration rules.
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002, S. Res. 3026, 107th Cong. (2002), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s107-3026.
123 GovTrack.us, H.R. 1020: Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 11-1020&tab=related (last visited Mar.
11, 2010); GovTrack.us, S. 931: Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-931&tab-=related (last visited Mar.
11,2010).
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B. The Findings
AFA's sponsors find that the FAA was only intended to apply to disputes
between commercial entities of similar sophistication and bargaining
power.124 However, following a series of Supreme Court decisions, the FAA
has been judicially extended to disputes involving non-union employees,
consumers, and franchisees: "parties of greatly disparate economic
power."l 25 With entire industries adopting mandatory arbitration clauses,
most individuals have no choice but to accept, and often do so without
knowing.126 With the Supreme Court in favor of PDAAs, lower courts are
forced to uphold such clauses, even if egregiously unfair. 127
C. Amendments to the Federal Arbitration Act
AFA amends the FAA by defining four new types of disputes:
"employment disputes," 28 "consumer disputes,"129 "franchise disputes," 30
124 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. Res. 1020, 111 th Cong. § 2(1) (2009); S.
Res. 931, 111th Cong. § 2(1) (2009).
125 H.R. Res. 1020 § 2(2); S. Res. 931 § 2(2).
126 H.R. Res. 1020 § 2(3); S. Res. 931 § 2(3).
127 H.R. Res. 1020 § 2(7); S. Res. 931 § 2(7).
128 An "employment dispute" is defined as "a dispute between an employer and
employee arising out of the relationship of employer and employee as defined by the Fair
Labor Standards Act." H.R. Res. 1020 § 3 (amending FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006), to insert
"(3) 'employment dispute'). The Senate resolution contains a slight modification,
defining an "employment dispute" as "a dispute between an employer and employee
arising out of the relationship of employer and employee as defined in section 3 of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203)." S. Res. 931 § 3(a) (inserting 9 U.S.C.
§ 401(3)).
129 A "consumer dispute" is defined as
a dispute between a person other than an organization who seeks or acquires real or
personal property, services [including services relating to securities and other
investments (S. Res. 931 only)], money, or credit for personal, family, or household
purposes and the seller or provider of such property, services, money, or credit.
H.R. Res. 1020 § 3 (amending 9 U.S.C. § 1, to insert "(4) 'consumer dispute'); S. Res.
931 § 3(a) (inserting 9 U.S.C. § 401(2)).
130 A "franchise dispute" is defined as
a dispute between a franchisor and franchisee arising out of or relating to contract or
agreement by which-(A) a franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business
of offering, selling, or distributing goods or services under a marketing plan or
836
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and "civil rights disputes" (Senate version only),131 and prohibits "pre-
dispute arbitration agreements"l 32 to arbitrate these four types of disputes.133
Courts, not arbitrators, are required to determine whether an agreement falls
into one of these four prohibited categories, and must apply federal law when
doing so. 134 Where applicable, the AFA applies to any dispute or claim
arising after its enactment, effectively banning all prohibited PDAAs, both
prospectively and retroactively.s3 5 While the House bill does not apply to
system prescribed in substantial part by a franchisor; (B) the operation of the
franchisee's business pursuant to such plan or system is substantially associated with
the franchisor's trademark, service mark, trade name, logotype, advertising, or other
commercial symbol designating the franchisor or its affiliate; and (C) the franchisee
is required to pay, directly or indirectly, a franchisee fee.
H.R. Res. 1020 § 3 (amending 9 U.S.C. § 1, to insert "(5) 'franchise dispute"'). The
Senate resolution contains a slight modification defining a "franchise dispute" as "a
dispute between a franchisee with a principal place of business in the United States and a
franchisor arising out of or relating to contract or agreement by which-[the rest of the
text is the same as the House Resolution]." S. Res. 931 § 3(a) (inserting 9 U.S.C.
§ 401(4)).
131 A "civil rights dispute" is defined as
a dispute-(A) arising under-(i) the Constitution of the United States or the
constitution of a State; or (ii) a Federal or State statute that prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race, sex, disability, religion, national origin, or any invidious basis
in education, employment, credit, housing, public accommodations and facilities,
voting, or program funded or conducted by the Federal Government or State
government, including any statute enforced by the Civil Rights Division of the
Department of Justice and any statute enumerated in section 62(e) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to unlawful discrimination); and (B) in which at
least I party alleging a violation of the Constitution of the United States, a State
constitution, or a statute prohibiting discrimination is an individual.
S. Res. 931 § 3(a) (inserting 9 U.S.C. § 401(1)).
132 A "pre-dispute arbitration agreement" is defined as "any agreement to arbitrate
disputes that had not yet arisen at the time of the making of the agreement." H.R. Res.
1020 § 3 (amending 9 U.S.C. § 1, to insert "(6) 'pre-dispute arbitration agreement'). The
Senate resolution contains a slight modification defining a "pre-dispute arbitration
agreement" as "any agreement to arbitrate a dispute that had not yet arisen at the time of
the making of the agreement." S. Res. 931 § 3(a) (inserting 9 U.S.C. § 401(5)).
133 H.R. Res. 1020 § 4 (inserting 9 U.S.C. § 2(b)); S. Res. 931 § 3(a) (inserting 9
U.S.C. § 402(a)).
134 H.R. Res. 1020 § 4 (inserting 9 U.S.C. § 2(c)); S. Res. 931 § 3(a) (inserting 9
U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)).
135 H.R. Res. 1020 § 5; S. Res. 931 § 4; see also ACR REPORT, supra note 17, at 74.
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PDAAs in CBAs,136 the Senate bill expressly forbids PDAA preemption of
litigation as a forum for statutory claims (both in the Union and non-Union
context),' 37 thereby overruling a very recent Supreme Court decision, 14
Penn Plaza.138
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Arguments in Favor of the AFA
Opponents of PDAAs argue that a legislative response is required to rein
in the judiciary's expansion of arbitration. 139 By invalidating PDAAs in the
four target contexts, AFA removes many problems related to fairness,
including unequal bargaining power, uninformed decisionmaking, skewed
procedures, and opacity.140 By giving parties a choice to refuse arbitration, it
ensures that those who agree do so voluntarily.141 By delegating to the courts
all authority to determine the validity or enforceability of an agreement to
arbitrate, AFA eliminates concerns that arbitrators are biased towards
enforcing PDAAs and returns these classes of disputes to a public forum.142
Consumers and franchisees would be able to pursue their claims via class
action, 143 and the common law would be free to develop.144
B. Arguments Against the AFA
The primary criticism of AFA is that it is too broad: "[a]t bottom, the
Arbitration Fairness Act applies a meat cleaver to an issue that requires a
136 H.R. Res. 1020 § 4 (inserting 9 U.S.C. § 2(d)).
137 S. Res. 931 § 3(a) (inserting 9 U.S.C. § 402(b)(2)).
138 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009) (enforcing PDAA
within CBA requiring arbitration of ADEA claims).
139 Schwartz, supra note 53, at 1338-40; see also Stemlight, supra note 83, at 6
(referencing twenty years of pro-arbitration Supreme Court precedent, and similar
legislative responses in Europe).
140 ACR REPORT, supra note 17, at 38.
141 Id
142 Id. at 38, 73.
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scalpel."l 45 The AFA eliminates the potential for developing a fast, efficient,
fair, and low-cost dispute resolution process.146 The AFA creates uncertainty
for judicial arbitration doctrines, more than thirty years of bicameral deferral
to such doctrines, and business practices dependent on this certainty.147 In
addition, some of the findings cited in support of the AFA are not supported
by empirical data.148 Other criticism points out that the AFA does not go far
enough. The AFA does not reduce costs associated with arbitration. 149 The
AFA also does not provide any measures to inform consumers about
arbitration clauses (if agreed to in a post-dispute agreement).150
C. Other Proposals for Reform
Congressional action on the issue can be prohibitive (like AFA) or
regulatory.1st Opponents of the AFA reject prohibition and suggest a
regulatory response instead. For example, the Association for Conflict
Resolution (ACR) encourages the adoption of a uniform act. 152 The ACR
Report concludes that the FAA should be amended to "insure access to,
transparency in, and fairness in the administration and conduct of the
mandatory arbitration process," including respecting minimum due process
requirements, minimum standards for arbitration procedures, and minimum
standards for selecting arbitrators.153 Other suggestions include making
145 Rutledge, supra note 81, at 7.
146 ACR REPORT, supra note 17, at 7.
147 Id. at 8.
148 Id. at 18; see also Rutledge, supra note 81, at 4 (arguing that Congress should be
cautious given the limited empirical record).
149 Casey, supra note 143, at 18A.
150 Id.
151 Stemlight, supra note 83, at 6.
152 ACR REPORT, supra note 17, at 85-87. The ACR Report rejects the current
language of AFA and instead recommends a set of principles to guide pre-dispute
arbitration agreements: arbitration must be conducted in accordance with due process
requirements; arbitrators should be required to maintain integrity and impartiality; the
costs borne by parties should bear a reasonable relationship to claim size; the process
should be transparent to all users; opt-out provisions for unwilling participants;
safeguards for the arbitrator selection process; greater participation by ADR provider
organizations and professional dispute resolution organizations (especially by issuing
model codes); and more pragmatic judicial doctrines (such as a stronger and bolder
unconscionability doctrine). Id. at 9-12, 75-76.
153 Id. at 85-87.
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PDAAs enforceable against defendants but not plaintiffs, enforcing PDAAs
while allowing claimants de novo appeals to courts, or expanding the
jurisdiction of small claims courts. 154 If a regulatory approach is adopted
sponsors have a variety of model codes for inspiration. 55 In addition, states
could be encouraged to adopt the 2000 revisions to the Uniform Arbitration
Act.156
Supporters of the AFA argue that a regulatory response is too narrow.157
In addition, the regulatory approach was unsuccessfully attempted by Senator
Sessions (R-AL) during the 107th Congress. 5 8 The provisions of that
amendment provided for fair disclosures, procedural rights, and protection
against denial of any other rights.159 Most notably, one of the procedural
rights allowed for an opt-out of arbitration and transfer to small claims court
154 Schwartz, supra note 53, 1330-31.
155 See, e.g., AM. ARB. Ass'N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1998),
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010); AM. ARB.
Ass'N, EMPLOYEE DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1995), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28535 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010); DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL
FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPuTEs ARISING OUT OF THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995), available at http://www.bna.com/-
bnabooks/ababna/special/protocol.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2010); International Institute
for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, Clauses and Rules, http://www.cpradr.org/-
ClausesRules/tabid/40/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 11, 2010); International Chamber
of Commerce, Commission on Arbitration, http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/arbitration-
/id2882/index.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2010); UNICTRAL ARBITRATION RULES (UN
1976), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/-lm/un.arbitration.rules.1976/portrait.pdf; see
also Brennan et al., supra note 15, at 14-15 (survey of model PDAAs and services
available through international organizations); John Wilkinson, Arbitration Contract
Clauses: A Potential Key to a Cost-Effective Process, 16 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 9, 9-12
(2009) (model proposal for a commercial arbitration PDAA).
156 UNIF. ARB.ITRATION ACT, §§ 1-33 (amended 2000), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uarbalarbitratl213.pdf; see also Mazadoorian,
supra note 26, at 21-22 (overview of Uniform Arbitration Act, the 2000 revisions, and
states which have enacted the revisions).
157 See Sternlight, supra note 83, at 6.
158 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002, S. Res. 3026, 107th Cong. (2002), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=sl07-3026.
159 Id. The list of procedural rights included: competence and neutrality of the
arbitrator and process, mandatory choice of law rules, a right to representation, rules
applicable to arbitration hearings, rules of evidence applicable to arbitrations, a right to
cross examination, a right to a record of the proceedings, timely resolution of claims, a
written decision, guidelines for dividing expenses, and an opt-out to small claims court.
S. Res. 3026 § 2 (amending FAA, 9 U.S.C. (2000)).
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(if the court had jurisdiction and the claim was within the court's statutory
amount).160
V. CONCLUSION
The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, if passed, stands to be the strongest
congressional statement on arbitration since the passage of the Federal
Arbitration Act. However, the bills have been referred at a time when
Supreme Court precedent encourages use of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements, and if passed, will derail volumes of such precedent. For this
reason the AFA is highly controversial, but in line with the debate
concerning PDAAs, which has been controversial for decades. The FAA was
enacted when Congress intervened and legislatively overruled judicial
precedent suppressing arbitration. The AFA promises to be a similar
intervention, except its purpose is the exact opposite of the FAA; the AFA
seeks to slow down the spread of PDAAs and, in so doing, is likely to
suppress arbitration as well.
Igor M Brin
160 S. Res. 3026 § 2(b)(1 1) (amending 9 U.S.C.).
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